Beware! Fraudsters Exploit CySEC’s Name in Sophisticated Scams

A Fresh Warning from the Regulator

Cypruss financial regulator has raised the alarm over a new round of frauds where criminals pose as commission staff and pressure investors into paying upfront charges. According to the latest warning, the emails use fabricated signatures, stamps, and even made-up employee names to appear authentic. Victims are told they must pay fees to unlock frozen funds or acquire a so-called “trading certificate,” supposedly required for their investments to remain compliant. In some cases, the requests involve significant sums of money disguised as “regulatory costs,” but in reality, the regulator stresses it never charges individuals for certificates or fund releases.

Previous Alerts on Loss-Recovery Schemes

This isn‘t the first time the regulator’s name has been misused. In a prior advisory, CySEC flagged a wave of so-called “loss-recovery” websites that promised to help victims reclaim money from failed or fraudulent investments. Some operated under names like “getyourmoneyback” or “chargebackme,” and they often insinuated ties to the regulator. In reality, they harvested sensitive data and demanded upfront “processing” or “verification” fees—leaving many victims facing fresh losses rather than refunds.

These operations frequently relied on paid social media promotions to find targets who had already reported losses. From there, they funneled people to web forms, cold emails, or phone calls to collect personal details—IDs, bank statements, transaction histories—before pushing for advance payments under the guise of case reviews, certificate issuance, or tax clearance.

A Common Thread: Fake Official Ties

Both scams share a dangerous feature—the misuse of CySEC‘s authority to build credibility. Whether through emails that mimic official correspondence or websites that imply regulatory backing, fraudsters exploit the public’s trust in financial watchdogs. By appropriating the regulator‘s name, they lower victims’ defenses and make the payment requests seem legitimate. The careful use of official-sounding domains, forged documentation, and references to compliance requirements all serve to mask what is, at its core, a simple money-grab.

Conclusion

Together, these cases illustrate how scams prey on two sides of investor psychology. The first manipulates fear, convincing people that unless they pay, their investments may be blocked or deemed non-compliant. The second exploits hope, promising to recover funds already lost if only another payment is made. Both tactics succeed because they lean on urgency, authority, and the natural desire to protect or reclaim money.

The regulators message is clear: no genuine oversight body will ever demand upfront fees to release funds or certify trading activity.